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Abstract
By introducing the government’s preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework
of unionized mixed oligopolies, this study investigates the efficiency of privatization. The
results show that (i) regardless of the government’s preference for tax revenues, its incentive
to privatize a public firm depends on the number of the private firms and (ii) social welfare
can decrease with an increase in the number of firms depending on the level of government’s
preference for tax revenue. Moreover, if the number of private firms and the government’s
preference for tax revenue are sufficiently small, then social welfare under a unionized priva-
tized oligopoly is greater than under a unionized mixed oligopoly while the government has
an incentive not to privatize the public firm, and vice versa if only the number of firms is
sufficiently large.
JEL: C7, D43, H44, J51, L13.
Keywords: Government’s Preference, Social Welfare, Tax, Privatization, Union.
1 Introduction
Recently, the economic implications of mixed oligopoly markets have been an issue with respect
to the change in competition for both market structure efficiency and privatization. This means
that public firms still play an important role in most economic realms. There are several studies
of mixed oligopolies1. In such models, a public firm traditionally maximizes social welfare, while
the private firms compete with the public firm maximizing their own profits.
From the perspectives on public choices, when governmental intervention, such as a produc-
tion subsidy, is incorporated into the mixed oligopoly, White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001),
and Myles (2002) showed that all firms’ profits and social welfare are identical before and after
the privatization of the public firm in a mixed oligopoly, irrespective of whether the public firm
moves simultaneously with the private firms or the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader or all
firms behave as profit-maximizers. On the other hand, Fjell and Heywood (2004) demonstrated
that when the public leader is privatized and becomes the private leader, the optimal subsidy,
output and social welfare are reduced. Moreover, by introducing taxes (ad valorem or specific)
in a mixed oligopoly, Mujumdar and Pal (1998) showed that privatization can increase both
social welfare and tax revenues, where an increase in tax does not change the total output but
increases the output of the public firm and the tax revenue.
In all the abovementioned studies that consider both subsidies and taxation in a mixed
oligopoly market, the public firm as well as the government maximize social welfare, which is
defined as the sum of the tax revenue or subsidy, consumers’ and producers’ surplus. However, in
the real world there exist some conflicts of interest between the public firm and the government.
Most existing studies cannot appropriately evaluate these situations2. To evaluate privatization
∗Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Jangjeon-dong, Geumjeong-gu, Pusan
609-735, Republic of Korea, Tel:+82-51-510-2532; Fax:+82-51-581-7144; E-mail: choipnu@pusan.ac.kr
1Many of the issues concerning mixed oligopolies have been analyzed: partial privatization, capacity choice,
and endogenous timing and so on. For the recent literature on the mixed oligopoly models, see Barcena-Ruiz
(2007), Matsumura (1998), Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) and references therein. See also De Fraja and
Delbono (1990), Bo¨s (1991) and Nett (1993) for the general reviews of the mixed oligopoly model.
2Exceptions are, to the best of the author’s knowledge, Matusumura (1998), Saha and Sensarma (2008) and
Kato (2008) who explicitly incorporate different objective function between the public firm and the government
in the mixed duopoly. We will mention later several differences. See footnote 5 for more on this point.
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programs, we have to deviate from the framework of traditional models that involves a monolithic
entity that seeks to maximize social welfare. It has been argued in the literature that there is
another way to limit the discretionary power of governments when a Leviathan government exists
(see Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). For example, Oates (1985) and Zax (1989) found empirical
support for Leviathan, while Forbes and Zampelli (1989) rejected the Leviathan3. Therefore,
this literature contains a number of puzzles for which fiscal centralization and the size of the
public sector (Oates, 1989). These two contrasting views clearly reflect different perceptions of
policy-making. Firstly, government is a benevolent maximizer of social welfare. Secondly, it
intrinsically is a tax-revenue maximizer.
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a framework within which the above two con-
trasting views regarding welfare can be modeled and compared. We assume that the public firm
gives full weight to the social welfare, while the government attaches weight to both its social
welfare and preference for tax revenues. This assumption is appropriate because in reality, the
government and a public firm do not function as a coherent entity4. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, Matusumura (1998), Saha and Sensarma (2008) and Kato (2008) attempted to an-
alyze the differing objective functions of the government and public firm in a mixed duopoly
setting5. More specifically, Kato (2008) showed that without the presence of unions, the gov-
ernment’s privatization of the public firm depends on its preference for tax revenues. This is
because the government is assumed to give more weight to tax revenue than to social welfare,
whereas the public firm is only concerned with maximizing social welfare. To study the effects
that arise when the objective functions of the government and a public firm are different, we
extend Kato’s (2008) model, which focuses on the efficiency of privatization by allowing firms
to collectively bargain through their unions, rather than the framework used in Matusumura
(1998) and Saha and Sensarma (2008).
The theoretical results of the present study, however, treat the problem of a mixed oligopoly
in which the government can choose to privatize the public firm by facing a union-bargaining
process. Kato’s (2008) findings indicated that the government has no incentive to privatize the
public firm if it sufficiently prefers tax revenues. In contrast, our paper shows that regardless of
its preference for tax revenues, the government’s incentive to privatize the public firm depends
upon the number of the private firms, when all firms, including the public firm, has an incentive
to opt for decentralized bargaining. Moreover, in terms of comparing a mixed duopoly with
a privatized duopoly, Kato (2008) focused only on the government’s payoff while our paper
investigates how properties of social welfare are affected by the government’s preference for tax
revenues because there may be conflicts between the public firm and government with regard to
the efficiency of privatization. First, we find that social welfare can decrease with an increase
in the number of firms depending on the government’s preference for tax revenues. Second,
some numerical calculations show that if both the number of private firms and the government’s
preference for tax revenues are sufficiently small, the social welfare under a unionized privatized
3In theoretical studies of the Leviathan government, Edwards and Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000) used
formalized tax-competition models to address the issue and showed that the results of tax competition are am-
biguous. For more detailed treatment of the Leviathan government, recent theoretical as well as empirical studies
include Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) and Bru¨lharty and Jamettiz (2007, 2006).
4According to Wilson (1989) and Tirole (1994), “government agencies generally pursue multiple goals. More-
over, many of these goals are hard to measure, and incentives based on measurable goals must be limited to not
completely jeopardize the nonmeasurable dimensions of social welfare. Indeed, several missions can be pursued
by different officials of the same agencies. Composite missions that reflect the several goals optimization may not
fit the officials self interest.”
5Saha and Sensarma (2008) showed that if the government is producers’ profit oriented, it will accommodate
the private firm’s aggression and cut back the public firm’s output through partial privatization. Considering
partial privatization, Matusumura (1998) assumed that the government puts more a larger weight on consumer
surplus than on producers’ surplus.
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oligopoly is greater than that under a unionized mixed oligopoly where the government has an
incentive not to privatize the public firm. On the other hand, if only the number of private
firms is sufficiently large, the government always has an incentive to privatize the public firm
regardless of the government’s preference for tax revenues, while the social welfare under a
unionized mixed oligopoly is greater than that under a unionized privatized oligopoly. These
main results in our paper are in contrast to the findings of De Fraja and Delbono (1989) in the
mixed oligopoly that the privatization can enhance social welfare when the number of existing
private firms is relatively large.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. Section 3
presents the results of unionized mixed and privatized oligopoly market. Section 4 presents the
comparisons of social welfare and government’s payoff with the privatization. Section 5 closes
the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a mixed oligopoly situation for a homogeneous good that is supplied by a public firm
and private firms. Firm i (i = 1, ..., n) is a profit-maximizing private firm and firm 0 is a public
firm that maximizes social welfare. Assume that the inverse demand is characterized by
p = 1− x0 −
n∑
i=1
xi,
where x0 is the output level of the public firm and xi is the output level of the private firm i.
On the demand side of the market, the representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic
function given by
U = x0 +
n∑
i=1
xi − 12
(
x0 +
n∑
i=1
xi
)2
.
The firms are homogeneous with respect to productivity. Each firm adopts a constant returns-
to-scale technology where one unit of labor is turned into one unit of the final good. The price
of labor (i.e., wage) that firm j has to pay is denoted by wj , j = 0, ..., n.
To analyze the union’s wage bargaining, we also assume that the public and private firms
are unionized and that wages wj , j = 0, 1, ..., n are determined as a consequence of bargaining
between firms and unions. Let w denote the reservation wage. Taking w as a given, the union’s
optimal wage-setting strategy regarding firm j, wj , is defined as
max
wj
uj = (wj − w)θxj ; j = 0, 1, ..., n, (1)
where θ is the bargaining power for wages. As Haucap and Wey (2004), Leahy and Montagna
(2000) and Lommerud et al. (2003) suggested, we assume that the union possesses full bargaining
power (θ = 1) and w = 0 to show our results in a simple way6. Thus, we assume that the union
sets the wage, while public and private firms unilaterally decide the level of employment.
Each firm’s profit is as following function
pij = (p− wj)xj − txj , j = 0, 1, ..., n
6The papers that are closest to our representation of the unions’ utilities are Naylor (1998, 1999), Haucap and
Wey (2004), Leahy and Montagna (2000), and Lommerud et al. (2003). As they suggest, the monopoly union
sets the wages but the firm unilaterally decides the level of employment. This is because the wage claims are
decided by the elasticity of labor demand rather than the firm’s profit. See also Oswald and Turnbull (1995). De
Fraja (1993) also adopted this kind of unions’ utilities.
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where t is the specific tax rate. On the other hand, the public firm’s objective, W is to maximize
welfare, which is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus, the profits of individual firms, and
the utilities of unions less the tax revenue. Thus, the public firm aims to maximize social welfare,
which is defined as
W = U −
n∑
j=0
pxj +
n∑
i=1
(pii + ui) + pi0 + u0 (2)
= U − T,
where U −∑nj=0 pxj is the consumer surplus, T = t(x0 +∑ni=1 xi) is tax revenue, and pij is the
profit of firm j (where j indexes the private firms and the public firm), uj is the utility of union
j (where j indexes the private firms and the public firm).
In the manner of Kato (2008), we also assume that the government’s payoff is given by
G = W + (1 + a)T where T = t(x0 +
n∑
i=1
xi), (3)
where a is the parameter that represents the weight of the government’s preference for tax
revenues. Here a ≥ 0, i.e., the government values tax revenues T more than social welfare W .
Finally, a three-stage game is conducted. The timing of the game is as follows. In the
first period, the government sets the specific tax. In the second period, if each firm’s union
is allowed to bargain collectively, union j chooses its wage, wj . In the third period, each firm
simultaneously chooses its quantity xj to maximize its respective object knowing each union’s
choice of the wage level.
3 Results
Before comparing the government’s payoff and social welfare, we first consider all firms and
the government’s maximization problems. In this paper, since we focus on symmetric Nash
equilibrium, we assume that all private firms choose the same type of bargaining. Thus, the
game is solved by backward induction, i.e., the solution concept used is the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
3.1 The Unionized Mixed Oligopoly
In this case, the public firm’s objective is to maximize welfare which is defined as the sum of
the consumer surplus, individual firms’ profits, and unions’ utilities less the tax revenues. Thus,
given wj and t for each firm j (j = 0, ..., n), the public firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
x0
W = U − T s.t. (p− w0 − t)x0 ≥ 0.
As in Ishida and Matsushima (2008), the constraint implies there is some lower-bound restriction
on the public firm’s profit, i.e., the public firm faces a budget constraint7.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λ, the Lagrangian equation can be written
as
L(x0, λ) =
n∑
i=1
xi + x0 − tx0 −
n∑
i=1
txi − (
∑n
i=1 xi + x0)
2
2
+ λ(x0 − x20 −
n∑
i=1
xix0 − w0x0 − tx0).
(4)
7In this model, if the public firm’s union does not face the budget constraint with a simple Stone-Geary utility
function ui = (wi−w)θxi, the public firm’s union can indefinitely raise its wage because the optimal output level
of the public firm is independent of the wage.
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Taking as w0 and t, by solving the first-order conditions (4), we obtain
∂L
∂x0
= 1− nxi − x0 − t+ λ(1− 2x0 − nxi − w0 − t) = 0, (5)
∂L
∂λ
= 1− nxi − x0 − w0 − t = 0. (6)
On the other hand, the optimal output for the private firm is given by
∂pii
∂xi
= 0⇔ xi = 1
n+ 1
(1− x0 − wi − t). (7)
Given these results, we now obtain the output level for each firm. By solving the first-order
conditions (6) and (7), we obtain,
x0 = (n+ 1)(1− w0 − t)− n(1− wi − t), (8)
xi = w0 − wi, (9)
λ =
nxi + x0 + t− 1
1− 2x0 − nxi − w0 − t . (10)
To solve the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian equation, the budget constraint is momen-
tarily binding. We check ex-post whether this omitted constraint is binding.
Next, a case where each union’s wage is determined as a result of collective bargaining
between the firm and the union is considered. To do this, the two independent maximization
problems should be considered simultaneously. Using (8) and (9), the problems for union j are
defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 = [(n+ 1)(1− w0 − t)− n(1− wi − t)]w0,
max
wi
ui = wixi = (w0 − wi)wi.
Straightforward computation yields each firm’s reaction function as follows:
w0 =
1 + nwi − t
2(n+ 1)
, wi =
w0
2
. (11)
Then, an equilibrium wage, denoted as w∗j , j = 0, ..., n is obtained by solving (11); the substitu-
tion of each (11) into (8) and (9) yields the equilibrium output, x∗j . The equilibrium wage and
output, w∗j and x
∗
j , respectively, can be obtained as:
w∗0 =
2− 2t
3n+ 4
, w∗i =
1− t
3n+ 4
; (12)
x∗0 =
(2n+ 2)(1− t)
3n+ 4
, x∗i =
1− t
3n+ 4
. (13)
We now move to the first stage of the game. From (12) and (13), the government’s payoff,
G, in the mixed oligopoly can be rewritten as follows:
max
t
G =
(1− t)(3n+ 2)[2(3n+ 4)(1 + at)− (1− t)(3n+ 2)]
2(3n+ 4)2
.
Straightforward computation yields the optimal tax rate as follows:
t∗ =
a(3n+ 4)− 2
(3n+ 2) + 2a(3n+ 4)
. (14)
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If the weight of the government’s preference for tax revenues is sufficiently large in the case of
a > 23n+4 , the optimal tax rate becomes positive. Conversely, when it is small in the case of
a < 23n+4 , the optimal tax rate becomes negative; in the case of a =
2
3n+4 , the optimal tax rate
is zero. We find that the greater the weight of the government’s preference for tax revenues, the
higher is the tax rate that the government imposes8. Thus, by using (14), we have the following
result.
Lemma 1: Suppose that each firm’s union is allowed to bargain collectively. Then, the equilib-
rium wages and output levels are given by
w∗0 =
2(1 + a)
(3n+ 2) + 2a(3n+ 4)
, w∗i =
1 + a
(3n+ 2) + 2a(3n+ 4)
;
x∗0 =
(2n+ 2)(1 + a)
(3n+ 2) + 2a(3n+ 4)
, x∗i =
1 + a
(3n+ 2) + 2a(3n+ 4)
.
By substituting Lemma 1 into (10), we obtain
λ =
1
n+ 1
> 0,
which shows that the budget constraint is binding. Using lemma 1, and noting that G∗ =
W ∗ + (1 + a)T ∗ and W ∗ = U∗ − T ∗, we can compute the government’s payoff, G∗, and social
welfare, W ∗ as follows;
G∗ =
(1 + a)2(3n+ 2)
2[3n+ 2 + 2a(3n+ 4)]
, (15)
W ∗ =
(1 + a)2(3n+ 2)(6 + 3n)
2[3n+ 2 + 2a(3n+ 4)]2
. (16)
As shown, all equilibrium outcomes depend on both a and n. Thus, we now investigate how
the properties of social welfare vary with the number of firms and the government’s preference
for tax revenues in the unionized mixed oligopoly. Differentiating (16) with respect to n, we
obtain
∂W ∗
∂n
= 6(1 + a)2
{
a2(32 + 24n)− a(8 + 24n+ 18n2)− (2 + 3n)2
[3n+ 2 + 2a(3n+ 4)]4
}
(17)
for which the sign changes according to the numerator of (17). Let the numerator of (17) denote
f(a). We can determine the sign of f(a) by applying f(a) to a discriminant, since the numerator
of (17) in the quadratic function is parabolic. Thus, ignoring the negative solution for a∗ by the
assumption a > 0, we have the solution a∗ with n > 1 is as follows9.
a∗ =
(8 + 24n+ 18n2) +
√
(8 + 24n+ 18n2)2 + 4(32 + 24n)(2 + 3n)2
2(32 + 24n)
.
8Differentiating (14) with respect to n, we obtain ∂t
∗
∂n
= (1+a)(3n+4)
2
[(3n+2)+2a(3n+4)]2
> 0.
9For tedious calculations, the formal solutions of these results are available from author upon request. However,
we provide the Appendix B that will not be included in the main paper. The Appendix B is is only available for
the referees.
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Since the minimum value is attained from 32 + 24n > 0, there can exist a critical value such
that for all a < a∗, we obtain the derivative as ∂W
∗
∂n < 0, and for all a > a
∗, as ∂W
∗
∂n > 0
10.
The intuition for the case n > 1 is as follows. First, consider the condition (17) for the
special case where a = 0. In this case, the condition is given by ∂W
∗
∂n =
−6(2+3n)2
(3n+4n)4
< 0. It follows
that given the same objective function for the public firm and the government, social welfare
can decrease with an increase in the number of firms. Moreover, since
∂W ∗
∂a
=
−6(1 + a)(2 + 3n)(2 + n)2
[3n+ 2 + 2a(3n+ 4)]3
< 0,
which indicates a negative value of the derivative, ∂W
∗
∂n is initially decreases in n given a. How-
ever, as n increases, a increases and then reaches the critical value of a∗, following which the
sign of the derivative ∂W
∗
∂n becomes positive
11. Thus, an increase in the number of firms induces
a to reach the value of a∗, after which the critical value n > n∗ can exist such that for all a > a∗
and n > n∗, we obtain the derivative as ∂W
∗
∂n > 0. Consequently, in terms of the overall effect of
the number of firms on the social welfare W ∗, we observe that ∂W
∗
∂n is initially negative given a
sufficient small a < a∗ but becomes positive as a and n increase.
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Figure 1. The Unionized Mixed Oligopoly: a ∈ (0, 30] and n ∈ [1, 100]
Figure 1 depicts over the parameter space the different values of social welfare in a bargaining
equilibrium within a monopoly. Thus, the comparative statics of the social welfare are summa-
rized by the following.
Proposition 1: Suppose that each union is allowed to bargain collectively. Then, the social
welfare initially decreases in n given sufficiently small values of a and subsequently increases
with n given sufficiently large values of a.
10We also obtain a∗∗ = 35.5 with n = 1. Hence, there can exist a critical value such that for all a∗∗ = 35.5 > a,
we obtain the derivative as ∂W
∗
∂n
|n=1< 0, and for all a > a∗∗ = 35.5, as ∂W∗∂n |n=1> 0.
11Nalyor (2002) showed that in a unionized bilateral oligopoly, industry profits are initially increasing in the
number of firms if unions have sufficient bargaining power. Ishida et al.(2008) showed that when the effect of
increase in the number of firms increases the dominant firm’s incentive for R & D investment, industry profits are
increasing in the number of firms.
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The intuition underlying Proposition 1 is straightforward. Initially, for a small values of a < a∗,
the social welfare-reducing effect operates because it dominates the social welfare-enhancing
effect given a sufficiently small n and vice versa. Thus, contradicting to the standard Cournot-
Nash oligopoly model, social welfare can decrease with n given sufficiently small levels of a.
In other words, in a mixed oligopoly, wages are determined through endogenous bargaining.
However, the social welfare-reducing effect is offset by the welfare-enhancing effect within a labor
market that arises from an endogenous wage bargaining process. This is because at sufficiently
large levels of n, the increase in social welfare outweighs the impact of the decrease in a, as is
evident from the derivation ∂W
∗
∂a < 0. Therefore, the decrease in welfare with a is due to the
larger weight that the government assigns to tax revenue in comparison with social welfare.
On the other hand, we find that the sign of
∂G∗
∂a
=
(1 + a)(3n+ 2)[4a+ 3an− 2]
[3n+ 2 + 2a(3n+ 4)]2
(18)
changes in accordance with a = 24+3n . Thus, the government’s payoff is U-shaped with respect
to a, for a given number of firms, n. In addition,
∂G∗
∂n
=
6a(1 + a)2(3n+ 1)
[3n+ 2 + 2a(3n+ 4)]2
> 0, (19)
which shows that the government’s payoff always increases in n. This is because when the
number of existing private firms increases, the negative effect of the government’s preference for
tax revenue is dominated by the positive effect of the rising tax rate derived from ∂t∗/∂n > 0.
3.2 The Unionized Privatized Oligopoly
The previous subsection examined at the impact of unionized mixed oligopoly given the bargain-
ing case. This subsection compares the equilibrium of a unionized mixed oligopoly which would
be established in a unionized privatized oligopoly case with unions’ decentralized bargaining
process. As discussion in the basic model, consider a unionized privatized oligopoly situation
for a homogeneous good supplied by firm l = 1, ..., n+ 1. Firm l is a profit-maximizing private
firm.
In the third stage, given wl and t, the firm l’s maximization problem is to maximize pil =
(pc − wl − t)xl where pc = 1−
∑n+1
l=1 xl : n ≥ 1. Hence, solving the first-order condition yields
xl =
1− wl − nxm − t
2
, l 6= m.
Thus, the output levels are given by
xl =
(2− n)(1− t)− 2wl + nwm
4− n2 , l 6= m. (20)
Turning to the second stage, we consider a case where each union’s wage is determined as a
result of collective bargaining between the firm and the union. Thus, problem for union l is
defined as
max
wl
ul = wlxl =
wl[(2− n)(1− t)− 2wl + nwm]
4− n2 .
Straightforward computation and symmetry among private firms yield each firm’s wage;
wl =
(2− n)(1− t) + nwm
4
, l 6= m. (21)
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Therefore, an equilibrium wage, denoted as wci is obtained by solving (21), and substituting each
(21) into (20) yield the equilibrium output xci . Thus, we have the following result:
wcl =
(2− n)(1− t)
4− n , x
c
l =
2(1− t)
(4− n)(2 + n) . (22)
Turning to the first stage and using the equilibrium output and wage, the government’s
payoff Gc in unionized privatized oligopoly can be rewritten as follows:
max
t
Gc =
2(n+ 1)(1− t)[7 + n− n2 + nt+ 8at+ 2ant− an2t+ t]
[(4− n)(2 + n)]2 .
Straightforward computation yields optimal tax rate in the unionized privatized oligopoly as
follows:
tc =
a(4− n)(2 + n)− 6 + n2
2[(1 + n) + a(4− n)(2 + n)] . (23)
If the weight of the government preference for the tax revenue is sufficiently large (in the case
of a > 6−n
2
(n+2)(4−n)), the optimal tax rate becomes positive
12. Conversely, when it is small (in the
case of 0 ≤ a ≤ 6−n2(n+2)(4−n)), the optimal tax rate becomes negative; in the case of a = 6−n
2
(n+2)(4−n) ,
the optimal tax rate is zero. As in the previous analysis, we also find that the greater the weight
of the government preference for the tax revenue, the higher the tax rate the government im-
poses. Similar to previous subsection, we have the following result.
Lemma 2: Suppose that the all private firms’ union is allowed to bargain collectively. Then,
the equilibrium wages and output levels are given by
wcl =
(4− n2)(1 + a)
2[(1 + n) + a(4− n)(2 + n)] , x
c
l =
(1 + a)
(1 + n) + a(4− n)(2 + n) .
Similar to previous subsection, using lemma 2, and noting that Gc = W c + (1 + a)T c and
W c = U c − T c, we can compute the government’s payoff Gc and social welfare W c as follows;
Gc =
(1 + a)2(1 + n)
2[(1 + n) + a(4− n)(2 + n)] , (24)
W c =
(1 + a)2(1 + n)[7 + n(1− n)]
2[1 + n+ a(4− n)(2 + n)]2 . (25)
As mentioned in the case of unionized mixed oligopoly, we now investigate how social welfare
varies with the number of firms in the unionized privatized oligopoly. Differentiating (25) with
respect to n, we obtain
∂W c
∂n
=
(1 + a)2
2[1 + n+ a(4− n)(2 + n)]4 {a
2(288 + 168n− 12n2 − 28n3 − 12n4 + n6)
− a(12 + 28n+ 22n2 + 8n3 + 2n4)− (6 + 14n+ 11n2 − 4n3 − n4)} (26)
for which the sign changes with the numerator of (26). Similar to ∂W
∗
∂n in the previous subsection,
let the numerator of (26) denote g(a). Again we can determine the sign of g(a) by applying g(a)
12Differentiating (23) with respect to n, we also obtain ∂t
c
∂n
= 2(4−n)
2(3+n)
4[(1+n)+a(4−n)(2+n)]2 > 0.
9
to a discriminant. Thus, ignoring the negative solution for ac by the assumption a > 0, we have
the solution ac is as follows13.
ac =
(12 + 28n+ 22n2 + 8n3 + 2n4)±√Q
2(288 + 168n− 12n2 − 28n3 − 12n4 + n6) where
Q = (12 + 28n+ 22n2 + 8n3 + 2n4)2
+ 4(288 + 168n− 12n2 − 28n3 − 12n4 + n6)(6 + 14n+ 11n2 − 4n3 − n4)
Since the minimum value is attained from 288 + 168n − 12n2 − 28n3 − 12n4 + n6 > 0 with
n > 1(n 6= 3 and n 6= 4)14, there can exist a critical value such that for all a < ac, we obtain the
derivative as ∂W
c
∂n < 0, and for all a > a
c, as ∂W
c
∂n > 0.
Therefore, the social welfare in the monopoly bargaining equilibrium over the parameter
space {a, n} is drawn in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The Unionized Privatized Oligopoly: a ∈ (0, 30] and n ∈ [1, 100]
Intuition is similar to the mixed oligopoly case. Depending on the critical level of ac and
nc, the social welfare tends to increase as the number of firm increases. Thus, the comparative
statics of the social welfare are summarized by
Proposition 2: Suppose that each union is allowed to bargain collectively. Then, except for
n = 3, the social welfare in unionized privatized oligopoly initially decreases in n given suffi-
ciently small values of a and subsequently increases with n given sufficiently large values of a.
From Proposition 2, we observe that ∂W
c
∂n is initially negative with sufficiently small a < a
c and
then positive as a and n increase.
13Similar to the solutions of a∗, for tedious calculations, the formal solutions of these results are available from
author upon request. However, we provide the Appendix B that will not be included in the main paper. The
Appendix B is is only available for the referees.
14Note that there are exceptions when n = 3 and n = 4. Since the maximum value is attained from 288 +
168n − 12n2 − 28n3 − 12n4 + n6 = −315 with n = 3. Thus, there can exist a critical value such that for all
a < ap ; 0.736, we obtain the derivative as ∂Wc
∂n
> 0 |n=3, and for all a > ap, as ∂Wc∂n |n=3< 0. Furthermore, g(a)
becomes linear function when n = 4. Thus, we obtain the derivative as ∂W
c
∂n
< 0 for n ≤ 2. Otherwise, ∂Wc
∂n
> 0
for n > 2.
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In addition,
∂W c
∂a
=
(1 + a)(1 + n)(7− n− n2)[n2 − 6 + a(4− n)(2 + n)]
2[1 + n+ a(4− n)(2 + n)]4 , (27)
∂Gc
∂a
=
(1 + a)(1 + n)[a(4− n)(2 + n)− 6 + n2]
2[1 + n+ a(4− n)(2 + n)]2 (28)
whose signs change along a = (7−n−n
2)(n2−6)
(4−n)(2+n) and a =
n2−6
(4−n)(2+n) , respectively. Furthermore, we
obtain
∂Gc
∂n
=
a(1 + a)2(6 + 2n+ n2)
4[1 + n+ a(4− n)(2 + n)]2 > 0, (29)
which this feature is similar to the mixed oligopoly case.
4 Comparative Statics
Once the equilibria for all firms and the government are derived as discussed in the previous
section, the mixed and privatized oligopolies can be endogenously determined by taking the level
of social welfare, each private firm’s profit, and the government’s payoff as given. Thus, each
difference in the optimal tax rate, outputs (x0+nxi = X∗, (n+1)xl = Xc), and the government’s
payoff are given by
G∗ −Gc = a(1 + a)
2(12 + 21n+ n2 − 3n3)
4[(1 + n) + a(4− n)(2 + n)][3n+ 2 + 2a(3n+ 4)] > 0 if 3 ≥ n. (30a)
Otherwise, G∗ −Gc < 0. (30b)
X∗ −Xc = (1 + a)a[8 + 30n− 2n
2 − 3n3]
[(3n+ 2) + 2a(3n+ 4)][(1 + n) + a(4− n)(2 + n)] > 0 if 3 ≥ n. (31a)
Otherwise, X∗ −Xc < 0. (31b)
t∗ − tc = (1 + a)[8 + 14n− 2n
2 − 3n3]
2[(3n+ 2) + 2a(3n+ 4)][(1 + n) + a(4− n)(2 + n)] > 0 if 2 ≥ n. (32a)
Otherwise, t∗ − tc < 0. (32b)
From (30), (31) and (32), we show that if n ≤ 3, both the total output and the govern-
ment’s payoff are always larger than those when the public firm is privatized. In this case where
n ≤ 3, the government does not have an incentive to privatize the public firm regardless of
the government’s preference for tax revenue. That is, the privatization of the public firm is
not desirable in terms of the government’s payoff when n ≤ 3 and the unions of all the firms,
including the public firm, are allowed to bargain collectively. On the other hand, if n > 4, both
the total output and government’s payoff in the mixed oligopoly are smaller than those in the
privatized oligopoly: therefore, the government has an incentive to privatize the public firm.
This is because the effect of the government’s preference for tax revenue dominates the effect of
the welfare-enhancing effect. That is, the positive value of ∂G
c
∂n has a larger effect on the gov-
ernment’s payoff than the positive value of ∂G
∗
∂n when the number of existing firm is sufficiently
large and vice versa. The results of this comparison are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Suppose that firms’ unions in the mixed and privatized oligopolies are allowed
to bargain collectively. Then, the government’s privatization of the public firm depends on the
number of existing firms, and the difference in the optimal tax rate between the unionized mixed
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and unionized privatized oligopolies also depends on the number of firms.
Regardless of the government’s preference for tax revenue, the Proposition 3 suggests that if the
number of existing private firms is sufficiently large, both the total output and the government’s
payoff is larger in a unionized mixed oligopoly than in a unionized privatized oligopoly. Thus, we
find that regardless of the government’s preference for tax revenue, the privatization of a public
firm is not desirable in terms of the government’s payoff if the number of firms is sufficiently
small and vice versa.
This proposition 3 differs from that of Kato (2008), which focused on comparing a mixed
duopoly with a privatized duopoly when there are no trade unions. Furthermore, Kato (2008)
demonstrated that if the government sufficiently prefers tax revenues, it does not privatize
the public firm, while our paper shows that regardless of the government’s preference for tax
revenues, the government has an incentive to privatize the public firm, which depends on the
number of private firms when all firms, including the public firm, have incentives to opt for
decentralized bargaining.
Next, we consider the case where social welfare and the government’s payoff are compared
to examine the incentives to privatize from the government’s and public firm’s perspectives.
Comparing W ∗ with W c, we obtain
W ∗ −W c = a2(320 + 736n+ 180n2 − 272n3 − 96n4 + 24n5 + 9n6)
− a(32 + 136n+ 180n2 + 52n3 − 42n4 − 18n5)− (16 + 18n+ 90n2 − 26n3 − 21n4 − 9n5).
Applying directly above equation to a discriminant, we have the solution a is as follows:
aC =
(32 + 136n+ 180n2 + 52n3 − 42n4 − 18n5)±√Y
2(320 + 736n+ 180n2 − 272n3 − 96n4 + 24n5 + 9n6)
where Y = (32 + 136n+ 180n2 + 52n3 − 42n4 − 18n5)2
+ 4(320 + 736n+ 180n2 − 272n3 − 96n4 + 24n5 + 9n6)(16 + 18n+ 90n2 − 26n3 − 21n4 − 9n5).
We have the solution a with n = 1, n = 2 and n = 3 is as follows.
aC1 ; −0.662260392 or a ; 0.284901902 when n = 1,
aC2 ; −1.72075922 or a ; 0.387425887 when n = 2
a ; 2.403119488 or a ; 0.63136327 when n = 3
Since the minimum value is attained from (320+736n+180n2−272n3−96n4 +24n5 +9n6) > 0
with n = 1, n = 2 and n = 3, ignoring the negative solution for a by the assumption a > 0,
there can exist a critical value such that for all a < aC1(respectively a < aC2) when n = 1
(respectively n = 2), we obtain W ∗ −W c < 0, and for all a > aC1(respectively a > aC2), we
obtain W ∗−W c > 0. However, since there always exist negative solutions for a when n = 3, we
obtain W ∗ > W c regardless of the critical value. Hence the critical level is aC1 ; 0.662260392
(respectively, aC2 = 1.72075922) whereby W ∗ = W c when n = 1 (respectively, n = 2).
However, since a comparison between the levels of social welfare with n > 4, we have a
critical value with imaginary number. Thus, W ∗ and W c becomes complicated as a result of the
simultaneous variation in the number of private firms and the preference level of the government
for tax revenues when n > 4, it is necessary to use numerical examples to illustrate the impact
of privatization and degree of social welfare. The table 1 in the Appendix A illustrates the this
case. The exogenous parameters are a and n. Starting from a given n ≥ 3, the social welfare,
W ∗ is always larger than W c. It follows that an increase in the number of private firms in the
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unionized mixed oligopoly improves social welfare more than a corresponding increase in the
unionized privatized oligopoly.
Hence, the comparison between social welfare in the unionized mixed oligopoly and unionized
privatized oligopoly can be interpreted as follows: if both the number of private firms and the
government’s preference for tax revenue are sufficiently small, the public firm has an incentive to
privatize while the government does not. However, if n = 3, then both the social welfare and the
government’s payoff in the mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the privatized oligopoly, i.e.,
W ∗ > W c and G∗ > Gc, irrespective of the government’s preference for tax revenues. Therefore,
the government never privatizes the public firm and there is no conflict of interest between the
public firm and the government if n = 3. Finally, if n > 4, then the government always has an
incentive to privatize while the public firm does not (i.e., W ∗ > W c and G∗ < Gc). The results
of this comparison are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: There are no conflicts of interest with respect to privatization between the public
firm and the government if the government has the perfect authority to privatize the public firm
and n = 3. However, when the public firm can intervene in the policy of privatization, conflicts
of interest with respect to privatization can arise between the public firm and the government if
one of the following holds: n > 4; a ∈ (0, 0.662260392) with n = 1; and a ∈ (0, 1.72075922) with
n = 2.
Proposition 4 suggests that differences in the implementation of privatization depend on the
political power structure between the public firm and the government. Contrary to De Fraja
and Delbono (1989), we have shown that the privatization of a public firm with the firm’s bar-
gaining process is desirable in terms of social welfare when the number of existing private firms
and the government’s preference for tax revenues are sufficiently small. These two contrast-
ing views of objective functions clearly reflect profoundly different perceptions of policy-making
(i.e., the privatization in the present paper). In other words the government can be a benevo-
lent maximizer when the number of firms is sufficiently small and the parameter relating to the
government’s preference for tax revenues is relatively large, and vice versa. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, the conflict between these two views of objective functions typically induces a conflict of
the privatization.
5 Concluding Remarks
By introducing the government’s preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of
unionized mixed oligopolies, this study provides new insight into the trade-off between social
welfare and the government’s payoff in a government’s optimal policy of privatization. Unlike
extant literature on mixed oligopolies that is based on the assumption of a monolithic entity
that involves the government and the public firm and that seeks to maximize social welfare, we
have found that the optimal privatization policies potentially differ from Kato (2008), which
focused on the government’s payoff for comparing mixed and privatized duopolies.
We have found that if both the number of private firm and the government’s preference for
tax revenues are sufficiently small, then the social welfare under a unionized privatized oligopoly
is greater than under a unionized mixed oligopoly, while the government has an incentive not to
privatize the public firm. Moreover, social welfare can decrease with an increase in the number
of firms depending on the level of government preference for tax revenue. On the other hand,
if the number of private firms is sufficiently large, the government always has an incentive to
privatize the public firm, regardless of its preference for tax revenues, while the level of social
welfare under the unionized mixed oligopoly is higher than that under the unionized privatized
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oligopoly. These results may indicate that differences in the implementation of privatization
depend on the political power structure between the public firm and the government.
Finally, we did not extend our results by considering a model where the public firm competes
with both domestic and foreign private firms, wherein the government seeks to maximize tax
revenues and social welfare at the same time. Also, in this paper, we have limited the policy
analysis to privatization. However, a richer policy, such as a lump-sum, ad valorem tax and
subsidy policies towards both the domestic and international mixed oligopolies are worth con-
sidering. There could be important economic implications if the analysis is expanded to include
the different bargaining motives among firms in the framework of the existing mixed oligopolistic
market. The extension of our model in these directions remains an agendum for future research.
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6 Appendix A
In this case where we have been abbreviated, we present on separate page15.
Table 1: Numerical Examples: When n ≥ 3
a = 0.1 a = 0.5 a = 1 a = 11
W ∗ W c W ∗ W c W ∗ W c W ∗ W c
n = 3 0.5397 0.1195 0.3222 0.1065 0.2410 0.0988 0.1347 0.0827
n = 5 0.4992 -1.6799 0.3099 -14.04 0.2360 -156 0.1358 -1.1140
n = 10 0.4630 -38.2524 0.2975 -1.6434 0.2304 -0.4907 0.1363 -0.1078
n = 15 0.4495 -269.5528 0.29260 -0.6084 0.2280 -0.2221 0.1364 -0.0561
n = 20 0.4425 -23.5021 0.2900 -0.3668 0.2267 -0.1430 0.1363 -0.0380
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
a = 15 a = 20 a = 25 a = · · ·
W ∗ W c W ∗ W c W ∗ W c W ∗ W c
n = 3 0.131342467 0.082038135 0.129033803 0.081545858 0.127643212 0.081245117 · · · · · ·
n = 5 0.13261785 -1.018671564 0.130387144 -0.95784139 0.129042262 -0.923076923 · · · · · ·
n = 10 0.133238879 -0.102264603 0.131093936 -0.098585925 0.129799615 -0.096419927 · · · · · ·
n = 15 0.133323542 -0.053447693 0.131214516 -0.051642264 0.1299258 -0.055871375 · · · · · ·
n = 20 0.133333198 -0.036251982 0.131243814 -0.035057927 0.129982358 -0.034352214 · · · · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
15Table 1 is obtained using Microsoft Office Excel.
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7 Appendix B
This appendix will not be included in the main paper. However, this is only available for the
referees. In this case where we have been abbreviated, we present on separate page16.
Table ?: Solution of a under the Mixed Privatized Oligopoly
The number of firm n a∗ a∗
1 60.5 -35.5
2 -1.683823529 0.742647059
3 -0.976439791 0.342931937
4 -0.751358696 0.21875
5 -0.641903172 0.159432387
...
...
...
20 -0.394963961 0.030396434
21 -0.391829195 0.0288255
22 -0.388997498 0.027408508
...
...
...
Table ??: Solution of a under the Unionized Privatized Oligopoly
The number of firm n ac ac
1 0.357693228 -0.179475406
2 1.643453416 -0.068453416
3 -0.73644954 0.092771383
4 N/A N/A
5 -0.607736499 0.317528083
...
...
...
20 -1.735125404 1.551748189
21 -1.817403863 1.6349634
22 -1.899811748 1.718209454
...
...
...
16Table ? and ?? are obtained using Microsoft Office Excel.
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